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INTERNAL SECURITY 
IS CREATED THROUGH 
COOPERATION
In 2013, the parliamentary Administration Committee noted in its report (HaVM 7/2013 
vp) that there were very serious reasons for submitting to Parliament a separate report on 
internal security that would enable an extensive and comprehensive examination of the status 
of internal security and the various questions and development measures associated with it.
In May 2016, the Government submitted to Parliament an Internal Security Report for the 
first time in Finnish history. The Report assessed the new challenges emerging in our security 
environment, especially from the perspective of the Ministry of the Interior’s administrative 
branch and the services it provides.
This Internal Security Strategy document continues the work initiated in the Internal Secu-
rity Report. Whereas the Report had a special focus on assessing the activities and needs 
of internal security authorities in a changing environment, this Strategy document looks at 
internal security from the perspective of a broader concept of safety and security. 
While the Internal Security Strategy was being drafted, the parliamentary Administration 
Committee submitted a report on the Internal Security Report (HaVM 5/2017 vp) and on this 
basis, Parliament adopted a Communication on the Internal Security Report (EK 8/2017 vp). 
In April 2017, the Government additionally published its Action Plan for 2017–2019, in 
which security has a high profile. Following a consultation with the Ministry of the Interior, 
the Administration Committee also issued a statement (HaVL 22/2017 vp) on aspects that 
should be addressed in the Strategy. The policies adopted in these documents were taken 
into account in this Strategy.
The preparation of the Internal Security Strategy began in autumn 2016. As predicted in 
the foresight work carried out for the Strategy, the world around us has already changed a 
great deal since the Government Report on Internal Security was adopted. Recent develop-
ment and events have shown that ensuring safety and security is more important than ever. 
The Strategy stresses that almost all social policy related decision-making is also relevant to 
security, and the security authorities’ actions are not alone sufficient to create and maintain 
Finland’s internal security; for this, multisectoral cooperation in a society built on trust is 
required. Collaboration at all levels of administration is at the core of preparing and imple-
menting the Internal Security Strategy and the related action plan.
Some 100 experts who represent more than 30 organisations, including public authorities, 
NGOs and the business sector, contributed to the preparation of the Strategy. Its meas-
ures were prepared by three expert groups. Expert group proposals were discussed by the 
Strategy’s steering group (Appendix 1), and on this basis, the ministerial working group on 
internal security and administration of justice adopted a draft action plan. A resolution to 
adopt the Strategy was made at a government session. 
PAULA RISIKKO
Minister of the Interior 
KUVA
9CONTENTS
1. THE OBJECTIVE OF INTERNAL SECURITY:  
 FINLAND IS THE SAFEST COUNTRY IN THE WORLD  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
2. SAFETY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
2.1  GLOBAL MEGATRENDS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
2.2 DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
2.3 DRIVERS OF CHANGE AND THREATS AFFECTING  
 INTERNAL SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  30
3. ACTION PLAN  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  35
 ATTACHMENTS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50
10
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR PUBLICATIONS 27/2017
THE OBJECTIVE OF 
INTERNAL SECURITY: 
FINLAND IS THE SAFEST
COUNTRY IN THE WORLD
The Internal Security Strategy, A Safe and Secure Life, is a roadmap for ensuring that Finland 
will be the safest country in the world for living, working and entrepreneurship, as envisaged 
in the Government Programme of 29 May 2015. 
Relying on studies and reports, the foresight section of the Strategy (Chapter 2) identifies meg-
atrends and drivers of change that will have an essential impact on Finland in the years to come. 
At the end of the foresight section, the Strategy examines how these drivers will be manifested 
now and in the near future as topical security threats. The strategic action plan (Chapter 3) 
consisting of eight sets of measures, on the other hand, describes the measures through which 
Finland will respond to and prepare for key drivers of change and security threats that will play 
a major role in internal security. The objective of the action plan is to improve the effectiveness 
of efforts to promote safety and security by drawing on cooperation and trust, which are central 
resources of Finnish society, and by improving network-based operating models. In total, the 
action plan contains 38 measures. The action plan's set of measures on Powers and capability 
will also improve the internal security authorities’ capabilities in keeping with the priority area 
of security adopted in the Government Action Plan 2017–2019. This Strategy and its measures 
replace the group strategy for the Ministry of the Interior’s branch of government and the earlier 
cross-administrative Internal Security Programme.
No single, firmly established or unambiguous definition for internal security exists. In a tra-
ditional dichotomy, security in society is divided into internal and external security. Among 
government actors, the Defence Forces see to external security, while the Police are mainly 
responsible for internal security. In the narrowest sense in the early days of the Republic of 
Finland, internal security was seen through the duties of the Ministry of the Interior and its 
agencies as "maintaining public order and security, or fighting perils that threaten society 
and private individuals through the state’s powers and enforcement actions"1. As Western 
society and the Nordic welfare state and rule of law evolved, the general concept of internal 
1.
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security has expanded to cover not only fighting threats but also individuals’ and organisa-
tions’ possibilities of enjoying their full fundamental and human rights. At the same time, the 
concept has evolved to include other elements besides the security task and field of actors 
of the Ministry of the Interior’s branch of government. We can thus say that the changing 
concept of security mirrors general societal development.
In this Strategy, internal security refers to those aspects of society that ensure everyone can 
enjoy the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the rule of law without fear or insecurity caused 
by crime, disorder, accidents or national or international events. This definition contains two 
factors. On the one hand, it describes issues that are seen as potential threats to internal 
security — crime, disorder, accidents and national or international events. On the other hand, 
it examines elements that cause or at least may cause fear or insecurity. While in earlier 
times, good internal security could be regarded as an absence of threats, today the way we 
experience different phenomena is also part of internal security. The Strategy starts from the 
premise that numerous internal and external drivers of change continuously threaten both our 
society and what we consider an acceptable security environment for it. One manifestation of 
this is that while the core areas of internal security, including public order and security and 
the right to life, physical integrity and protection of property, remain more or less unchanged, 
different aspects are emphasised at different times when we talk about security. Regardless of 
a decrease in annual traffic deaths during the last decade, for example, the number of these 
fatalities remains almost double the number of homicide victims; however, concerns and fears 
related to violence are more prominent in our conversations.
Good internal security is created as the sum of many different factors. Safety and security are 
promoted by such elements as a safe home, living and working environment, well-functioning 
basic services, equality of all people, a well-designed transport environment, access to help 
when it is needed and a certainty that those guilty of offences will be held liable for their 
acts. In other words, decisions and actions that affect internal security are taken in almost 
all areas of social policy. Especially the root causes of security problems, or the numbers and 
types of different security problems that emerge in our society, go back to other decisions 
than those primarily associated with security. The actual security-related decisions in most 
cases are more likely to influence the manner in which the existing security problems are 
responded to. Events taking place and decisions made outside Finland’s borders also have 
an increasing impact on internal security. In some areas of internal security, the development 
is fully dependent on the international situation.
Due to the diversity of the components of internal security, it would not be appropriate or 
even possible to attempt to address them all in this Strategy. For this reason, the focus of the 
Strategy is on phenomena in which risks affecting everyday safety and security have exac-
erbated significantly compared to previous years or which, without timely interventions, are 
expected to affect negatively the safety and security of the entire society or a large segment 
12
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of the population in the near future. The Finnish security authorities have capabilities for 
good responsiveness, and one of the Strategy’s priorities is securing these capabilities also 
in a changing world. As a slight exaggeration, however, we can say that reactive actions are 
always too late. This is why the Strategy also emphasises the importance of identifying and 
understanding the root causes. The best and most cost-effective way of maintaining society's 
safety and security is to implement preventive measures that address the root causes. While 
decision-making related to root causes is not within the remit of this Strategy, the Strategy’s 
measures will promote the assessment of security impacts and help to take account of them 
in decision-making of this type. In addition, the Strategy contains measures that, through 
improved cooperation, will be able to prevent risks stemming from the root causes and identi-
fied as heightened in the foresight work. These 
include the risks cited in the set of measures 
on Everyday security: offences arising from 
social exclusion, the safety and security of older 
and young people as well as segregation risks 
in growth centres.
The Internal Security Strategy was adopted 
as a government resolution. Prime Minister 
Sipilä’s Government has decided to reduce 
the number of government-level strategies to 
ensure the implementation and impact of their policies. Safety is the backbone of a stable 
and thriving society which is why this Strategy will be one of the most central security 
policies adopted by the Government. As discussed above, safety and security should be 
examined from a number of different perspectives. Consequently, this Strategy does not 
replace prior policies and decisions on security in force that partly address the same issues. 
Another feature of this Strategy thus is that its sets of measures complement or modify 
prior decisions, structures and measures to the extent that they do not adequately respond 
to developments ensuing from identified drivers of change or topical security threats. All 
ministries have duties associated with the safety and security of society within their remits, 
and this Strategy does not propose to change them. All ministries additionally have duties 
that are relevant to the aforementioned root causes of internal security. In recent years, deci-
sions have been made on numerous sectoral and cross-sectoral measures aiming to promote 
security, which are still up to date. Due to the complementary nature of this Strategy, its 
action plan does not reiterate all of these measures, even if they are of great importance for 
the whole. These include Parliament’s policies on the development of internal security, the 
Security Strategy for Society, the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the National Action 
Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism, the Action Plan against the 
Shadow Economy and Economic Crime, the Cyber and Information Security Strategies, the 
action plans on asylum policy and migration, the road safety strategy, government decisions 
on security of supply, the National Action Plan on Fundamental and Human Rights, the 
Measured by many indicators 
and in different assessments, 
Finland already is the safest 
country in the world. However,  
this sense of security has eroded 
in recent years. 
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National Crime Prevention Programme, government policies on reducing social exclusion 
among young people, and alcohol policy outlines. 
Measured by many indicators and in different assessments, Finland already is the safest 
country in the world2. As indicated by statistics, development over the last twenty years has 
been highly positive. This is a consequence of the long-term and systematic work carried out in 
Finland to build a safe and competitive welfare society. However, the sense of security is at the 
core of internal security, also according to the definition used in this Strategy, and this sense 
of security has eroded in recent years. In addition to the actual security situation, the sense 
of security is affected by wider societal changes and, in particular, instability factors. In the 
face of the recent economic recession, Finnish 
society has evolved in a stable and predictable 
manner since the turn of the millennium. This 
situation changed clearly in the mid-2010s, 
however, as a result of the altered situation of 
world politics. Without exception, all surveys 
measuring the sense of security in recent years 
have reflected this change — the sense of secu-
rity is eroding. In addition to sweeping changes 
and uncertainties, national and international 
crises, disasters and large-scale acts of violence 
have an even greater impact on the sense of security in today's networking world. Some of the 
security threats that are new to Finland, including terrorism and influencing through informa-
tion, strive specifically to exploit this fact. We must be able to respond to the eroded sense 
of security. Another challenge associated with measuring security is that recurring safety and 
security problems in everyday life accumulate very strongly on a small share of the population. 
In this situation, an examination based on averages and total numbers does not provide the 
full picture. For example, less than five per cent of the population commit more than one half 
of all offences, while ten per cent of the population experience more than two thirds of all 
violence. Additionally, the victims and perpetrators of offences often are the same persons in 
different situations and life stages. Due to this tendency for accumulation, we must be able 
to deliver more targeted safety and security in the environments and for the population groups 
most severely affected by the security problems. 
Large-scale incidents tend to be relatively minor exceptions in the running of our society, and 
the development of internal security is more frequently influenced by slow and imperceptible 
changes in society. Regardless of this, preparedness for accidents and everyday incidents is 
also a key part of internal security. Consequently, this Strategy examines not only drivers of 
change but also topical security threats, and it contains some measures related to prepared-
ness. The preparedness measures will be implemented following the cooperation model for 
comprehensive security adopted in the Security Strategy for Society.
Recurring safety and security 
problems in everyday life 
accumulate very strongly on a 
small share of the population.
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The authorities responsible for maintaining internal security are the Police, Customs, the 
Border Guard and the rescue, judicial and prison service authorities, but in keeping with the 
broad concept of safety and security that underpins this Strategy, social and health, transport 
and communications, education, culture and youth as well as labour and environmental 
authorities have important duties associated with the internal security sector. NGOs also 
promote people’s wellbeing and safety in many ways through their activities. They deliver 
activities and services that are important in terms of safety both independently and as 
partners for the authorities. The business sector provides the majority of the products and 
services people need every day. The security of business activities thus is both an important 
part of everyday security and a factor in our national competitiveness. The Strategy focuses 
on measures through which these actors can 
respond to identified drivers of change and 
security threats.
Finland’s security environment has undeni-
ably become more complex. The authorities 
need appropriate capabilities to face the new 
challenges and duties. No indications of the 
accustomed duties of the authorities becoming 
redundant came up in the course of the fore-
sight work for this Strategy. The authorities’ 
dwindling resources will continue to be tied 
up in managing the established critical basic 
duties. The same limited resources will be used 
to respond to new, diverse security threats. This challenging situation will require a careful 
reassessment of the authorities’ resources. In addition to the authorities’ operational activities, 
such elements as the role of municipalities, cooperation with NGOs and between different 
administrative branches, as well as the significance of the business sector and research will 
be stressed more than before.
In order to achieve its purpose — ensuring that Finland is the safest country in the world 
for living, working and entrepreneurship — the following goals have been selected for the 
Strategy on the basis of the key drivers of change:
• Ensuring that analyses of the security environment and anticipation of  
changes in it are up-to-date and effective
• Preventing insecurity that results from social exclusion in all its forms
• Ensuring efficient and productive security structures and processes
• Improving the crisis resilience of individuals and society through cooperation.
The strategy measures serving these goals are to be implemented before the next Internal 
Security Report is submitted to Parliament in 2020. Some of the measures involve contin-
In addition to the authorities’ 
operational activities, such elements 
as the role of municipalities, 
cooperation with NGOs and between 
different administrative branches, 
as well as the significance of the 
business sector and research will be 
stressed more than before.
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uous activities, and their implementation will continue after that milestone. The purpose of 
the measures is to control the security impacts of the phenomena identified in the foresight 
section, ensuring that Finland will be the safest country in the world for living, working and 
entrepreneurship as envisaged in the Government Programme also after 2020 and that the 
goals set by Parliament for internal security will be reached by 2025.
The Internal Security Strategy will be implemented as part of the operational and financial 
planning and performance management of the various administrative branches of central 
government. In respect of other parties involved, the implementation will take place on a 
partnership basis through extensive networked cooperation. The objectives and measures out-
lined in the Internal Security Strategy will be taken into account in local and regional security 
plans. An implementation plan prepared for the measures will contain concrete timelines, 
the parties taking part in the implementation of the measures, procedures and funding. The 
implementation plan and its monitoring indicators will be adopted by a cross-administrative 
strategy steering group that will be appointed separately. The steering group will regularly 
report on strategy implementation to the ministerial working group on internal security and 
administration of justice.
1 Finland’s Administrative Court, Ståhlberg, 1915
2 e.g. World Internal Security and Policy Report (WISP) and the World Economic Forum’s 
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SAFETY AND SECURITY 
IN A CHANGING WORLD
It is characteristic of security-related discussions and examinations that they focus on topical 
threats and concerns. However, trends and changes in the field of security are not areas 
detached from the rest of human and societal development. What we regard as safety and 
security and the values we attach to them are rather a consequence of other social, techno-
logical, economic, ecological and political development. For this reason, this chapter looks 
at global megatrends recognised in studies and reports, followed by a discussion of their 
significance for the development in Finland.
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SUSTAINABILITY CRISIS
The limited nature of natural resources 
is becoming increasingly evident. Global 
demographic growth continues, and climate 
change and dwindling natural resources 
will make humankind's dependence on 
its environment more and more critical. 
Energy, water, arable land and living space 
are limited resources that will be shared 
by a greater number of people. The status 
of the environment will challenge our life-
styles, attitudes,local and international 
decision-making and technologies.
The greatest question of the world 
economy is decoupling economic growth 
from overuse of natural resources and 
emissions.
Differences in the standards of living of 
the poor and the rich are a key challenge 
to humankind and an important back-
ground factor for global migration.4
The world’s economies are linked by 
interdependency, which we can to a great 
extent thank for the fact that today's world 
is more equal, wealthier and safer than 
ever before. There has been a reduction 
in traditional wars between states, armed 
conflicts and violence.
The interdependency between states, 
societies and communities continues 
to intensify, even if separatist tenden-
cies are also emerging. People, capitals, 
goods, ideas and services move across 
borders. 
The emphasis of the world economy has 
shifted from both sides of the Atlantic 
to Asia. China and India are significant 
economic powers. No clear turn for the 
better is in sight for the economic down-
turn in Europe. 
During its history as an independent 
state, Finland has never been isolated 
from the global operating environment. 
So far, globalisation has benefited us, 
even if it has meant tougher competition 
and forced us to look for new ways of 
increasing productivity. 
An economy dependent on exports, 
Western value networks, communication 
technology and international coopera-
tion have been among Finland’s success 
factors, especially over the last thirty years. 
An ability to operate in an interdepend-
ent environment is a lifeline for a small 
national state.3
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCY
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FATIGUE OF TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF DEMOCRACY
The fatigue of representative democ-
racy has been talked about in Western 
countries for years. Voting turnout rates 
and political parties’ membership keep 
declining. General welfare, equality, 
confidence, education, social capital, 
well-functioning institutions, employment 
and the economy are essential for the real-
isation of democracy and inclusion. In 
egalitarian and affluent societies, there 
is greater democracy. For the time being, 
Finland has fared well in international 
comparisons of the state of democracy 
and society. 
The rapid development of technology 
and globalisation are the most signifi-
cant dynamics affecting the realisation 
of representative democracy. Technology 
has led to fundamental changes in power 
structures, allowing people easy access to 
information via the internet. The volume 
of information and mounting challenges 
will make it increasingly difficult to find 
straight answers. Expectations related to 
direct exertion of influence will challenge 
conventional democratic decision-making. 
New ways of exerting influence are being 
created at an ever-increasing speed.5
TECHNOLOGY
Ubiquitous information technology sup-
ports and directs our daily lives but also 
shapes our attitudes and beliefs. The 
future of an open global information 
network is not something we can take for 
granted, however. Its use and expansion 
may be limited by security aspects and 
political factors.
The interface between technology and 
humans will become blurred. Automation 
and robotisation will shape educational 
needs and the world of work. Many occu-
pations will disappear, while completely 
new ones emerge.
Ethical and moral questions associated 
with technology will become significant 
and divide opinions.
 
3 Sitra Megatrends 2016: The future happens now 
4 Sitra Megatrends 2016: The future happens now 
5 Sitra Megatrends 2017: Nordic update
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DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND
SOCIETAL DEVELOPMENT
In Finnish society, work has guaranteed livelihoods, levelled out social differences and 
prevented social exclusion. This will also hold true in the near future. Over longer term, 
there will be changes in the possibilities of earning a livelihood, society's organisation 
around work, the significance of work for people's identities and the definition of work and 
meaningful duties. Work will not necessarily operate as a mechanism that equalises the 
distribution of income any longer. Economic wellbeing will become polarised6.It is likely 
that people’s livelihoods will be less and less based on the production and consumption 
of goods — and more on human activity and interaction. Digitalisation will open up new 
possibilities for producing value and earning livelihoods.7
An intense generation gap can be seen across Europe. Unemployment has been particularly 
harsh on young people. Solutions to sustaining the pension system appear to favour current 
pensioners over future generations of pensioners.8
The equality is a resource and a glue that holds society together in Finland. However, there 
is a threat of increasing polarisation for both social and technological reasons. Social 
exclusion and underprivilege risk being accu-
mulated. Radicalisation and problems affect-
ing the functioning of political systems are 
also reflections of this. There are indications 
that the share of young adults at risk of social 
exclusion is growing in Finland: according to 
an OECD study9, more than one out of five 
Finnish men aged between 20 and 24 are 
not in employment, education or training. The 
proportion of young people outside education, 
training or employment has been increasing 
in Finland since 2011. The reason for their 
exclusion often lies in mental health problems. However, the risk of permanent social exclu-
sion is not realised for all. According to the Research Institute of Finnish Economy ETLA’s 
estimate10, approximately 10% of this cohort are at risk of social exclusion. The average 
age of the population is increasing more rapidly in Finland than in any other EU country. 
It is estimated that in 2030, there will be more than 1.4 million people aged over 65 in 
Finland, or twice as many as in 200011. On the other hand, the birth rate is declining. The 
sustainability gap challenges the operating logic of an industrial society. 
2.2
The equality is a resource 
and a glue that holds society 
together in Finland. However, 
there is a threat of increasing 
polarisation for both social and 
technological reasons.
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The ageing of the population will not happen evenly across the country. Younger people move 
to larger cities, in particular, for work and studies. The population in the sparsely populated 
areas is getting older. This will set particular challenges for the provision of services by society, 
including the security authorities.
The central government and municipalities will depend more heavily on NGOs, companies 
and other organisations for organising services. Scarcity of resources will make it necessary 
to find new operating methods. Co-ownership and sharing will become more common in such 
areas as housing, motoring and provision of wellbeing services. 
Lifestyle differences between generations will increase. Young people have a more natural 
relationship with the information society than their elders. Especially in large cities, young 
people grow up in a more diverse environment than the older generations did, and their relation 
with multiculturalism will thus also be more straightforward. Traditions and customs will lose 
their significance from generation to generation. The role of authorities is transforming, and 
power will be divided in new ways. The aim is at an individual lifestyle, however looking to 
communities for support. Sub-cultures will be born, grow and disappear, often at a fast rate. 
People will be less inclined to identify themselves with the Finnish national state and civic 
society. In younger generations, this may be replaced by identification with models originating 
in other countries and cultures. 
Conflicts, demographic growth, insecurity, poverty, a desire to study and work as well as climate 
change will drive migration. Migration will shape cultures. Influences will spread from one 
country or person to another. Human communities will diversify, while distrust, xenophobia 
and integration problems will also raise their heads. In the geographic sense, international 
phenomena are already finding a concrete expression across Finland. 
The joint impact of several factors will make Finnish society more pluralistic. The fragmen-
tation of shared values may encourage juxtapositions.
Uncontrolled migration to Europe is associated with security risks, including terrorist links, 
rise of xenophobic extremist movements and different forms of crime. Extremely deep divi-
sions between the EU Member States may emerge in their responses to the refugee crisis and 
the growing number of immigrants. The root causes of this migration — different conflicts, 
crises and unstable societies — cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future, which will also 
influence the associated security risks.
The cultural diversification caused by migration will not affect all areas in Finland in the same 
way, and this will accentuate regional differences. The strongest impacts of immigration will 
be felt in large cities. It is estimated that one fifth of the population in the Helsinki region 
will be foreign-language speakers in 2030.
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In terms of immigrants’ quality of life, the manner in which they are accepted as part of 
communities, the speed at which this takes place, and the status allotted to them will be 
crucial. Access to education, training and the labour market is often crucial. The immigrant’s 
personal initiative in the integration process is vital and promotes integration.
The welfare challenges of Western societies will increasingly be associated with mental 
wellbeing, social capital and lifestyle diseases. Sustainable wellbeing means expanding the 
concept to the area of mental wellbeing, in which belonging to a community, happiness, a 
good life and meaningful activity are in an important role. The mental resilience of individ-
uals and society has links to these factors of wellbeing.
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
Technological development continues and appears to be speeding up. The trend shaped by the 
digitalisation of production, automation, robotics, the Industrial Internet and artificial intelligence 
is often called the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Actors and societies that create innovations, 
new products, services and business models will benefit from this trend. At the same time, it is 
likely that digitalisation and other technological advancement will also result in social exclusion. 
Some of it is about a conscious decision to opt 
out from undesirable development.
In the administration and politics, using big 
data and artificial intelligence may help to 
produce better solutions for a large group of 
people. Data collection may make it possible 
to address the experiences and needs of high 
numbers of people.
Technology may radically change the economy, 
democracy, administration, human practices and even humans as a species. Understanding 
technological development and its impacts on society, work, the economy and humans is a 
new civic skill that will enable people to participate fully in discussions on future.
Technical infrastructure and information networks and systems are closely interlinked. As 
we utilise technology more extensively, we will also be more vulnerable to natural disasters 
and deliberate acts. Questions of the cyber environment have become increasingly elemental 
parts of the foreign, security and defence policy. 
Media and free journalism are vital actors for society. Communication improves people’s 
possibilities for being aware of the state of the world and humankind. Social media, which 
was born from digitalisation, has rapidly become an interactive and participatory environ-
Technology may radically 
change the economy, democracy, 
administration, human practices 
and even humans as a species.
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ment. It enables increased awareness and constructive discussion but also the fuelling of 
conflicts. Fast-spreading false information can be used for destructive purposes, and it is 
easy to abuse and threaten people online with no fear of any restrictions placed by the legal 
system. The public opinion has never been clear-cut as a concept, but the social media may 
distort it further. 
The relationship between humans, the environment and technology is changing. The sig-
nificance of local communities will be highlighted when technology is used for maintaining 
social relationships.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The world’s economies are linked by interdependency. Capitals, goods, services and people 
move across borders. So far, Finland has been one of the winners of globalisation. The 
emphasis of the world economy has shifted to Asia, however, and no obvious solutions to 
Europe’s economic problems are in sight. In addition to the global downturn, Finnish economy 
has been hit by a reduced demand for wood 
processing industry products and electronics 
industry exports as well as a decline in the 
Russian trade due to a variety of reasons. This 
will have extensive local impacts, especially in 
those areas where some form of export industry 
has been the driver of the economy. Main-
taining a welfare society during a prolonged 
economic downturn is the most significant 
challenge to Finnish society, especially as the Finnish population is ageing faster than in 
other EU Member States. The dependency ratio will deteriorate, the number of working age 
population has been declining since 2009, and while the figures have improved recently, 
the unemployment rate continues to be high. Finland is a small, open economy and highly 
dependent on exports. Changes in an interdependent economic environment can have a 
dramatic impact on Finland; these changes may include strong turbulence in the eurozone, 
the deepening economic crisis in Russia, or the global financial crisis. Finland’s competi-
tiveness kept declining for a number of years. In 2014, the public debt exceeded 60% of 
GDP, and the ratio of general government expenditure to GDP in Finland is the highest in 
the OECD12. However, the Finnish export economy has recently shown signs of an upturn.
General government finances will remain in deficit at the end of the decade despite adjust-
ment measures introduced by the Government and a recovery of economic growth. The eco-
nomic upturn will not resolve the structural problems of general government finances, nor 
will it alone suffice to strengthen them sustainably in the long term. The public debt to total 
economic output ratio will remain high. Major structural reforms and cutbacks in the public 
Finland is a small, 
open economy and highly 
dependent on exports.
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economy are generally considered unavoidable13. These changes will affect the services and 
benefits that people receive and also the public mood.
ECOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT
The humankind is battling over the sufficiency of natural resources. Water, arable land, 
clean air and different minerals and other natural resources are at risk of being exhausted 
because of unsustainable use. The scientific community unanimously agrees on the inevita-
bility of climate change. Climate change and the insufficiency of natural resources will have 
dramatic, long-term consequences for the natural environment, human living conditions, 
world politics and economy and society. The need to transition from the fossil economy to 
a bioeconomy and the use of renewable natural resources has been recognised globally, but 
the joint commitment of different states on the targets will affect the rate of the change.
The Middle East, Africa and parts of Central Asia will be most prone to security risks caused 
by climate change. In the north, security is shaken up by the impacts of climate change 
on melting Arctic regions, clearly affecting regional geopolitical dynamics. 
Between 2008 and 2015, an average of 22.5 million people have left their homes because 
of natural disasters every year. Of these people, 95% are living in developing countries. 
Estimates say that the amount of climate refugees by 2050 could be anywhere between 
50 and 200 million14.
The impacts of ecological changes are not yet likely to be significant during the time span of 
this Strategy. However, sustainable development solutions are essential. At the same time, 
Europe should prepare for the strongly increasing migration caused by climate changes.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
While interdependency will continue to be central for global economic development, national 
interests and traditional power politics have made a comeback in international relations. 
The foreign policy of great powers is more visibly guided by needs arising from internal 
politics, which makes their actions less predictable. Respect for Western democratic values 
is eroding, and practices based on compliance with agreed rules are under pressure. While 
there is growing awareness of global problems, the operating capabilities of the UN and 
its subordinate organisations appear to be limited compared to the expectations placed on 
them. Their future is uncertain, and their failure to offer global leadership will maintain 
multipolarity in the world. Authoritarian ideologies and nationalism have emerged as a 
challenge to existing structures which, in the Western countries, rely on liberalism. This 
has been enabled by experiences of liberal values and policies being unable to solve global 
problems that are increasingly present in people’s everyday lives.
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A strong transformation in the foreign and security political operating environment will con-
tinue in Finland’s neighbouring areas and also globally. Typical aspects of Finland’s changing 
security environment will include a fast pace of change and unpredictability. 
The complex power struggles in the Middle East and North Africa are resulting in phenomena 
whose duration and effects will still be seen in Europe and all other parts of the world for 
decades to come. The current political order is facing serious challenges in the Middle East. 
In the next few years, the European Union will have to resolve a number of major issues 
related to such aspects as immigration to Europe, the Union's cohesion as the geopoliti-
cal conflicts around it exacerbate, slow economic growth and eurozone stability. The full 
impacts of the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom on the European Union will only 
be seen over a longer time span. Uncontrollable migration and terrorist attacks put the 
Schengen agreement to test. Divisive forces are stemming from the internal development 
in certain EU Member States. Nationalism and nationalist politics have gathered increasing 
support in many of them. Growing immigration 
has also fuelled the extreme right and populism 
in Europe. These factors will erode the EU’s 
ideological basis and threaten its position as a 
community of shared values.
All Member States of the Union were hit by 
economic problems as a result of the finan-
cial crisis of 2008. Total economic output in 
the eurozone continues to be clearly less than 
before the crisis. Unemployment rates have 
reached record heights, public economies show 
severe deficits, and public debt rates have grown significantly. Especially in crisis countries, 
trust in political institutions has collapsed, and different populist and nationalist movements 
have gathered momentum. Also in Finland, 40% of the general public report that they are 
unsatisfied with the functioning of democracy15. 
The direction that the European Union will take is one of the big questions for Finland. 
The success or failure of the EU will have direct impacts on all of its Member States. The 
security situation requires the Member States to engage in closer cooperation. The EU is 
striving to intensify its activities in the area of internal security, which will put the Member 
States’ authorities under pressure.
A key feature of the Russian administration system is interlinked political and economic power 
based on networks and unofficial relations. Official institutions are weak, and the legal system 
is not independent. Rather than being able to reform the economic and social order, the 
The direction that the  
European Union will take is 
one of the big questions for 
Finland. The security situation 
requires the Member States to 
engage in closer cooperation.
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administration system produces uneven regional development, weak economic growth and 
non-linear policies. The financial outlook is increasingly dim, and the market mechanisms 
are dysfunctional, which puts stability at risk and makes the development difficult to predict.
In addition to evolving military means, political, economic and military pressure, forms of 
information and cyber warfare, their combinations and other means of hybrid influencing are 
used in the world to further political ends.
Even in normal circumstances, these types of influencing can be launched quickly. The 
objective is to expose the target to pressure, damage, uncertainty and instability. Hybrid 
influencing has also been used against Finland. An open society offers opportunities for 
turning even internal discussion into a crisis and attempting to manipulate the societal 
climate. Influencing the public opinion in Finland may be difficult, however, due to the high 
education level in our country and historical reasons. 
Terrorist organisations and networks are able to exploit not only different types of cross-bor-
der criminality but also new technologies, including information networks and materials for 
weapons of mass destruction. Their power stems from extreme ideologies and flourishes in 
conditions characterised by social exclusion, unemployment and lack of prospects, weak or 
failed government and a lack of security mechanism that respects fundamental freedoms 
and human rights, as well as violence and inequality. 
DIFFICULTY OF SECURITY FORESIGHT
In conventional security thinking, security has been seen as a separate entity that only 
needs attention when something that threatens it has already happened. Changes in the 
security situation will be increasingly likely in the future, however, and preparing for them 
in advance will be difficult.
The security thinking must grasp the causes of the problems before the consequences 
escalate into security challenges. Especially in social and intoxicant abuse policy, decisions 
may be made that will significantly advance the security of society — but also security 
decisions that have negative impacts, even immediately.
An individual’s personal actions and choices are the cornerstone of security in society. Experi-
ences of being in control of one's life, meaningful activity, opportunities for exerting influence 
and experiences of togetherness contribute to the feeling of security. All these can be supported.
Finland's strength has lied in being a small country with a relatively good level of equality 
that has maintained cohesion, coped with unexpected crises and been successful. Trust 
creates security. Finnish people also trust the authorities. The direction in which this trust 
will develop is a crucial question for a small country such as Finland. Finland is a country 
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with an extensive surface area, and the drivers of change do not affect all of its parts in the 
same way. However, the common direction of change in Finnish society is towards diversity. 
Complex relations of dependency create hybrid identities put together with many influences. 
Social and economic background direct choices of living areas, schools and careers.
The world is also less predictable in terms of security needs. Consequently, complex secu-
rity challenges require resilience: the ability of systems to operate flexibly in emergencies, 
recover quickly and, in the aftermath of a crisis, develop by learning from it. Preparing for 
the future will be ever more difficult. This is why it makes sense to anticipate and chart 
possible futures and the ways in which they can be tackled.
CONCLUSIONS
1.   The operating environment of internal security in Finland is now more complex 
than before, and it is also affected by factors outside the country. Changes in the se-
curity environment may take place at an extremely fast pace. Preparing accurate pre-
dictions is not possible even for a relatively short term. 
2.   The key internal security challenge in Finland is expanding social exclusion in all 
its forms. It exacerbates the risk of societal disruptions and to a great extent determi-
nes the need for reactive services produced by the security authorities. Radicalisation 
and the strengthening of extremist movements are the ultimate consequences of so-
cial exclusion in all its forms.
3.   The status of Finnish public finances put public administration structures under 
severe pressures to renew, which may have security impacts. The high levels of edu-
cation, security and technological development in our country are a significant inter-
national competitive factor. The security of high technologies is a particular challenge 
in terms of resources and competence. 
4.   The crisis resilience of Finnish society is based on the systems’ ability to opera-
te in incidents, preparedness for incidents as well as individuals’ mental resilience. 
External attempts to influence opinions are becoming more common and also seek to 
influence societal decision-making. 
6 Sitra Megatrends 2016: The future happens now
7 Sitra Megatrends 2017: Nordic update
8 Sitra Megatrends 2016: The future happens now
9 OECD Education at a Glance 2016
10 ETLA memorandum: NEET-nuorten tulkinnassa korjattavaa (R. Asplund, P.Vanhala, 2016)
11 Population forecast 2015 – 2065, Statistics Finland
12 https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-spending.htm
13 Economic Survey, Summer 2017 (Ministry of Finance Publication 28a/2017)
14 Sitra Megatrends 2016
15 Kenen mitta on täysi? (V. Pitkänen, J. Westinen / Ajatuspaja e2 2016) 
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DRIVERS OF CHANGE AND THREATS 
AFFECTING INTERNAL SECURITY
Seven drivers of change related to internal security can be derived from global trends and 
Finland's development. This strategy seeks to respond to these drivers to prevent the real-
isation of the threats arising from them.
DIVERSE POLARISATION
If the current development continues, economic wellbeing of population groups and regions 
will become polarised. Social, cultural and health-related polarisation development will also 
challenge a safe and secure welfare society. Inequalities and social exclusion are the most 
important background factors for conventional security threats, including crime and becom-
ing a victim of crime. In the phenomenon of social exclusion, different problems, including 
socioeconomic, intoxicant abuse and mental health problems, often accumulate on the same 
persons. In proportion to the size of their cohort, young men commit the most offences, 
and the share of young adults threatened by social exclusion is growing. The average age of 
the population is increasing more rapidly in Finland than in any other EU country. Rather 
than happening evenly across the country, the ageing of the population particularly affects 
sparsely populated areas. The number of safety and security problems related to ageing will 
thus grow in Finland and become visible in different ways in various areas. In growth centres 
with a high level of economic wellbeing, the increasing wellbeing and income gaps at the 
local level will be a challenge that may lead to the segregation of living areas.
FRAGMENTATION OF SHARED VALUES
Finnish society is becoming more pluralistic as a result of the joint impact of several factors. 
Lifestyle differences between generations will increase. International ideological communities 
and sub-cultures have a presence in Finland through contacts and communication enabled 
by information networks. The role of authorities is transforming, and power will be divided 
in new ways. Diversification of the population due to migration will increase the number of 
groups with shared values based on different cultures, beliefs and common life experiences 
in society. The diversity of value communities in society is a resource that may promote the 
development of Finnish society, but the actual or subjective fragmentation of shared values 
may also pull people apart and fuel confrontations and conflicts between groups. A society 
with a fragmented value base is also a more vulnerable target for tendentious influencing 
through information based on false information that aims to encourage confrontations.
2.3
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SECURITY IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION
While immigration is a question of resources for Finland in terms of such aspects as the 
population’s age structure, employment and thus the country's competitiveness, its scope 
and nature are also difficult to predict and control. Immigration must stay under control. 
Bi-directional migration shapes cultures but also affects internal security. Immigration from 
conflict zones to Finland may increase the presence of criminal and terrorist organisations 
in this country. While the threat of terrorism in Finland and Europe is not a consequence 
of migration, there are individuals prone to violent radicalisation among immigrants coming 
from conflict zones, which affects the phenomenon as a whole. This will require improved 
capabilities of the authorities. Migration also affects everyday safety and security. Distrust, 
offences and violent extremism that targets immigrants are exacerbating security threats 
in the era of growing immigration. In addition to immigrants, these security threats also 
concern a broader group of Finns who are ethnically or culturally different from the main-
stream population. Some immigrant groups are statistically over-represented as suspects 
of certain types of offences, and the viewpoint of security adds to the pressures to ensure 
immigrant integration. In particular, foreign nationals who are illegally staying in the 
country or waiting for removal from the country are vulnerable to violent radicalism, liable 
to perpetrate offences and prone to becoming victims of crime.
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EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS AND IDEOLOGIES
Polarisation, fragmentation of values, disinformation and the establishment of support 
networks for international terrorism in Finland will increase the visibility of extremist 
movements and their activities in Finnish society. These movements and ideologies are 
born in conditions characterised by social exclusion, unemployment and lack of prospects. 
In addition to preventing criminal activity of violent extremist movements, societal deci-
sion-making must be geared to ensuring that no areas or population groups susceptible to 
the rhetoric and recruitment efforts of such movements emerge in Finland.
ACCELERATING TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION
Technological development continues and appears to be speeding up. Technological devel-
opment will also create social exclusion. The cyber environment will be an increasingly 
important part of foreign, security and defence policy but also daily life as smart and online 
features become a component of more and more devices and processes that we use every day.
Technical infrastructure as well as information networks and systems are closely interlinked. 
While we use technology more and more extensively, improving the efficiency of both 
enterprising and daily life, we will also become more at risk of, and vulnerable to, natural 
disasters and intentional activities.
Digitalisation and social media are changing the practices of journalism and the sources 
in which people look for information. They will enable not only increased awareness and 
constructive discussion but also the fuelling of conflicts.
SLOW RECOVERY OF PUBLIC FINANCES
While Finland has benefited considerably from globalisation, maintaining a welfare state 
during a prolonged economic downturn is a significant challenge. Finland’s competitive-
ness has been declining for a number of years. The dependency ratio is deteriorating, the 
number of working age population has been declining since 2009, and the unemployment 
rate continues to be high. Cutbacks in the public economy and major structural reforms 
are generally considered unavoidable. Indirectly, these changes have a major influence on 
the public mood, with crucial impacts on internal security and especially the feeling of 
security. Pressures of public finances will lead to a situation where maintaining internal 
security merely by increasing the security authorities’ resources no longer will be possible.
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GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
The prioritisation of national interests and traditional rhetoric of power politics have made 
a comeback in international relations. The operating capabilities of international institu-
tions appear to be limited compared to the expectations placed on them, and both states 
and individuals have reservations about their ability to resolve problems of world politics.
The power policy exercised by states may be manifested in many and difficult-to-predict 
areas of life and societal activity that have close links with internal security and the undis-
rupted operation of a democratic society. 
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ACTION PLAN
SET OF MEASURES 1:
ANALYSIS AND 
FORESIGHT 
OBJECTIVE
Continuous analyses and foresight information based on studies, reports and statistics 
at the level of individual phenomena will be produced on internal security for the public 
administration, the business sector and the third sector. The purpose of the foresight 
activities will be responding to complex security problems earlier and more proactively with 
proportionate and more cost-effective action.
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RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:
Global security environment, diverse polarisation, fragmentation of shared values, security 
impacts of migration, technology, public finances, extremist movements and ideologies
SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS:
Up-to-date foresight and situation awareness
Efficient security structures and processes
MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE
1.   A strategic analysis and foresight function relevant to internal security will be es-
tablished to support government-level management, societal decision-making and 
network-based cooperation on internal security.  
The analysis and foresight function will collect, analyse and report information on 
internal security phenomena identified as being of key importance. The function 
will also engage in continuous foresight work related to internal security phenome-
na and produce assessments based on studies and reports on the impacts of diffe-
rent actors and areas of decision-making on security-related phenomena. The fun-
ction will have close links with the research coordination and funding cooperation 
related to internal security, and its activities will be coordinated with the Govern-
ment’s extensive foresight work and the activities of the comprehensive security 
foresight network.
2. Structures and practices for research and funding cooperation will be put in place 
between the Ministry of the Interior’s branch of government and the European Cent-
re of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid COE) with special focus on 
mental crisis resilience issues.
RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholder in bold)
The Ministry of the Interior - The function will be established within the Ministry of the Interior, 
where it will operate in collaboration with the Government, the internal security authorities as 
well as other key internal security actors. In addition to decision-makers, its services will be 
provided for those participating in internal security network cooperation, including authorities, 
regional and local government, NGOs as well as the business sector.
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SET OF MEASURES 2: 
POWERS AND 
CAPABILITIES
The set of measures will implement the objectives of the priority area of security in the 
Government Action Plan 2017–2019. A separate implementation plan has been drafted for 
this set of measures.
OBJECTIVE
The core functions and service level of the security authorities will be safeguarded. Changes 
in the security environment will be responded to by improving the security authorities’ 
situation awareness, updating their powers and enhancing their capabilities. 
At the moment, there is an untenable discrepancy between society's possibilities of respond-
ing to threats to national security and the damage that the threats would cause if realised. 
New manifestations of the threats include terrorism as well as hybrid and cyber threats, 
which may also be used as instruments of power policy. 
It will be ensured that all actors participating in protecting national security are kept abreast 
of the overall situation picture of the Ministry of the Interior and the Government and of 
information obtained through civilian intelligence.
The preparedness and capabilities of the security authorities will be improved in step 
with the requirements of the changing operating environment by developing their powers, 
preparedness, operating models and resources.
Security actors’ competence related to strategic security communications will be improved. 
Through cooperation between the authorities and other actors, the negative security impacts 
of intentional and tendentious spreading of false information will be reduced. 
RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:
Global security environment, diverse polarisation, fragmentation of shared values, security 
impacts of migration, technology, extremist movements and ideologies
MEASURES
5
42
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SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS:
Up-to-date foresight and situation awareness
Efficient security structures and processes
Crisis resilient individuals and society
MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE
The authorities’ powers and capabilities
1.   The authorities’ long-term resource planning will be ensured.
2.   The authorities’ powers in normal and emergency conditions as well as executive as-
sistance procedures will be reviewed, and legislative projects will be implemented to 
prepare for the threats of hybrid and information influencing, deal with illegal entry 
as well as ensure preparedness for and response to terrorism, extremist movements 
and cyber and economic crime. The Counter-Terrorism Strategy will be updated.
3.   Reserves that will also be available in normal conditions will be created for the Po 
lice and the Border Guard, and their members will be trained. The required legis-
lative amendments will be prepared. 
4.   A development plan will be drawn up to meet the personnel's competence needs, 
the internal security authorities’ core tasks and needs for more efficient cooperati-
on will be determined, policing activities will be prioritised, and a minimum com-
petence requirements will be determined for emergency response centre person-
nel, ensuring that these requirements will be met.
5.   Procurements of equipment and systems needed by the internal security authori-
ties to respond to major accidents, terrorism, hybrid threats, cybercrime and other 
threats arising in the changing operating environment will be made.
Decisions on the funding of the new functions and procurements will be made as the General 
Government Fiscal Plan and the Budget are prepared. Central government funding required 
for the measures will be provided within the spending limits by reallocating appropriations 
if necessary.
PREPAREDNESS AND READINESS
6.   Surveillance and border control on the eastern border and the visibility and capabi-
lities of the police will be enhanced by ensuring that there are adequate numbers of 
police officers, the preparedness plans will be updated, and cooperation with Fron-
tex will be intensified.
7.   The operating models for preparedness at all levels will be improved by further de-
veloping inter-authority cooperation, national risk assessment, storage methods, 
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letters of intent and stand-by agreements between public and private actors and 
readiness for major accidents as well as by organising sufficient training exercises 
associated with these areas.
8.   Between the Government Situation Centre, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry 
of Defence, other ministries and the Security Committee, an operating model for 
maintaining real-time situation awareness will be specified as stated in the govern-
ment bill on the Government Situation Centre.
9.   The needs to update the Emergency Powers Act will be assessed from the view-
points of different administrative branches.
10. The Ministry of the Interior will carry out a cross-administrative self-assessment of 
the status of civilian preparedness to identify key development areas. International 
criteria will be used in this assessment.
Hybrid influencing will be identified, and strategic communications will be used to bolster 
a sense of security.
11. The efficiency of information exchanges between the authorities in the Ministry of 
the Interior’s administrative branch and the Government Situation Centre will be 
improved in the context of observations of incidents that can be deemed to be asso-
ciated with potential attempts at hybrid influencing.
12. Strategic security communications will be developed as part of the authorities’ nor-
mal and crisis communications in cooperation with private and third sector actors. 
Strategic security communications means that correct information from the right 
actor and at the right time reaches those who are vulnerable to different types of 
messages which erode the feeling of security. In these activities, topical security 
phenomena that are associated with tendentious dissemination of false information 
will be prioritised.
CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE
13. Full use will be made of civilian intelligence in order to protect national security 
against terrorism, illegal intelligence activities and other threats. Permanent coope-
ration structures will be created that will enable all actors that can prevent and fight 
threats to national security to access the information they need, to facilitate multi-
lateral information exchanges and to agree on any measures together as indicated 
by the duties and responsibilities of the various actors. 
CYBER SECURITY
In addition to the implementation plan of the Finnish National Cyber Security Strategy 
2017–2020, the following measures will be implemented:
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14. An action plan for activities aiming to prevent cybercrime will be prepared. The 
needs to develop national legal aid legislation to ensure more efficient fight against 
cross-border criminality, especially regarding cybercrime, will be investigated.
RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholder in bold)
The Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry 
of Finance, other ministries and authorities, the Security Committee
SET OF MEASURES 3: 
EVERYDAY 
SECURITY 
OBJECTIVE
Coordination between the authorities’ and the justice system’s activities and services that 
strive to prevent offences will be ensured to reduce the number of offences committed by 
socially excluded people as efficiently as possible. 
Early multiprofessional intervention will be made in the social exclusion of young people.
Active measures will be taken to improve the safety and security of older people, children 
and young people and to reduce geographic segregation in growth centres.
RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:
Diverse polarisation, security impacts of migration, fragmentation of shared values, extremist 
movements and ideologies
SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS:
Combating insecurity caused by social exclusion
Efficient security structures and processes
5
3
MEASURES
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MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE
1.   An operating model for reducing crime associated with social exclusion will be 
prepared, in which the activities of the different authorities and other stakehol-
ders providing preventive services are integrated in the criminal procedure in a 
coordinated manner and addressing the needs of the individual. Regarding the 
authorities subordinate to the Government, the operating model will be put to 
practice by means of guidance, whereas cooperation practices will be put in place 
with the other actors.
2.   An operating model and guidelines will be created for mutual information exchan-
ges on security threats between the authorities, the business sector and NGOs, 
especially in multiprofessional work. Seamless cooperation between the security 
authorities and healthcare will be ensured in order to prevent violence and crime 
caused by mental health problems. Any needs for legislative amendments will be 
investigated, and the amendments will be implemented.
3.   School health surveys will be used systematically to improve the safety and security 
of young people and to prevent security problems caused by social exclusion.
4.   The safety and security programme for older people (2011) will be updated. The 
recommendations and solutions of the programme will be integrated in the security 
planning of the counties and municipalities. Particular attention will be paid to ol-
der people’s opportunities for equal participation in issues related to security. 
5.   Cities’ capabilities for preventing segregation tendencies within their areas will be 
enhanced by diverse methods. Operating models will be created for building good 
relations between population groups in local communities. By means of promoting 
good relations between population groups, people’s sense of wellbeing and security 
will be built up, and tensions between population groups will be defused and offen-
ces will be prevented.
RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholders in bold)
The Ministry of Justice/the National Council for Crime Prevention and the Advisory Board for 
Ethnic Relations, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Ministry 
of the Environment, the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Employment, the Police, the Prosecution Service, the criminal sanctions authorities, 
the Regional State Administrative Agencies, the Association of Finnish Local and Regional 
Authorities, the National Institute for Health and Welfare, the counties, the municipalities 
and NGOs. 
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SET OF MEASURES 4: 
SECURITY KNOWLEDGE 
AND CRISIS RESILIENCE
OBJECTIVE
Finnish society will consist of crisis resilient individuals who have versatile security knowledge 
and skills and who are prepared for different everyday incidents. Crisis resilience means 
that individuals have capabilities for facing different incidents that cannot be completely 
prevented or anticipated, even through good capabilities of the authorities, and to recover 
from them quickly.
The crisis resilience of society and individuals will be improved by network-based cooperation 
between the Government, NGOs, associations and the business sector. The third sector plays 
a major role in improving individuals’ crisis resilience. The NGOs work close to people and 
offer many types of opportunities for learning, participation and exerting influence.
In particular, the security knowledge of children and young people, and those working with 
them, will be improved, taking the needs and strengths of the different target groups into 
account. Security culture in early childhood education and care and at schools and educa-
tional institutions will be promoted. The security knowledge of early childhood education and 
care staff and teaching staff at educational institutions will be strengthened through basic 
level and continued training.
 
RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:
Diverse polarisation, fragmentation of shared values, global security environment, tech-
nology, public finances, extremist movements
SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS:
Efficient security structures and processes
Crisis resilient individuals and society
5
4
MEASURES
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MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE
1.   An action plan on improving people’s crisis resilience will be prepared and imple-
mented in cooperation with authorities and NGOs.
2.   Solutions and recommendations relevant to the capabilities, skills and knowledge of 
individuals and organisations when preparing for different security situations will be 
produced following the 72-hour concept and drawing on the results of programmes 
related to everyday safety and security. In particular, the focus will be on promoting 
mental crisis resilience and topical challenges to security skills, including protection 
from information and hybrid influencing. In this work, the preparedness and readi-
ness work linked to the Security Strategy for Society will be taken into account where 
appropriate. The particular target for this measure will be groups who have previously 
been side-lined in preparedness activities, including women and young people.
3.   Continuing education aimed for building up the security skills of early childhood 
education and care staff and personnel in the teaching sector will be targeted espe-
cially at directors of early childhood education and care services and principals of 
schools and educational institutions. Children and young people’s security skills will 
be built up through instruction, and their multiliteracy skills will be improved. Mul-
tiliteracy supports the development of critical thinking and learning skills and has 
strong links with ICT skills. Children and young people’s opportunities for participa-
ting in decision-making related to everyday security will be improved.
4.   Research-based knowledge of terrorism, violent radicalisation and hybrid threats 
that is significant for Finland’s security will be built up.
RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholder in bold)
The Ministry of Education and Culture, the Finnish National Agency for Education, the Min-
istry of the Interior, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Ministry of Justice, the 
Security Committee, the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, the Regional 
State Administrative Agencies, the counties, the municipalities, the National Institute for 
Health and Welfare, Finance Finland, the Finnish Red Cross, the Finnish National Rescue 
Association and other NGOs 
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SET OF MEASURES 5: 
SECURITY  
INNOVATIONS
OBJECTIVE
The internal security innovation programme will implement the objectives of the Government's 
key project on digitalising public services and research, development and innovation activities 
that improve competitiveness and productivity.
The goal is using new technologies innovatively in security work and providing innovative 
services. New technologies will be key when striving for digital public services and practices 
that will improve productivity and profitability.
Finnish innovations and public sector reference customers will facilitate the creation of 
successful Finnish export products and services. Cooperation between the authorities and, 
in particular, small and medium new technology enterprises will be increased.
RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE: 
Technology, public finances
SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS:
Efficient security structures and processes
MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE
1.   A joint internal security innovation programme of the internal security authorities 
and the Finnish business sector will be prepared and implemented. In its preparati-
on, international models and good practices will be taken into consideration.
2.   The take-up of innovations will be incorporated in the performance guidance system of 
the Ministry of the Interior’s branch of governments.
3.   Innovative public procurement tools and processes will be used to promote innovation 
cooperation between authorities and companies. 
5
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RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholder in bold)
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications, the internal security authorities, the Regional State Admin-
istrative Agencies, the counties, companies and the business sector, Sitra, Tekes 
 
 SET OF MEASURES 6: 
STEERING OF 
INTERNAL SECURITY
OBJECTIVE
An interoperable, phenomenon-based steering system will be created to respond to new and 
complex internal security phenomena.
The increasingly complex security environment, new security challenges and their root causes 
do not respect the old boundaries between administrative branches. Many of the problems 
require simultaneous and coordinated action from several branches of administration to offer 
a response that is cost-effective for society. This will require phenomenon-based and cross-ad-
ministrative knowledge and skills related to internal security and its steering at different levels. 
RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:
Global security environment, diverse polarisation, fragmentation of shared values, security 
impacts of migration, technology, public finances, extremist movements and ideologies
SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS:
Up-to-date foresight and situation awareness
Efficient security structures and processes
6
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MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE
1.   Based on continuous foresight work, fixed-term cross-administrative goals for inter-
nal security will be defined.
2.   When determining the means for achieving these goals, network-based cooperation 
across administrative boundaries will be stressed, and the different steering models 
and structures of the authorities and other security actors will be taken into account.
3.   The activities of the internal security authorities will be prioritised, addressing 
phenomena that can be the most effectively influenced by each authority’s own and 
joint measures.
4.   Process-like steering of the criminal justice system will be developed to optimi-
se the collaboration and impact of criminal investigation and prosecution authori-
ties, the courts and the Criminal Sanctions Agency on the basis of analysed, re-
search-based knowledge.
5.   Cross-administrative competence in steering the authorities’ activities will be imp-
roved by developing procedures for appointing public officials to their posts, job 
rotation and career paths to support the development of multisectoral competence. 
RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholder in bold)
The Ministry of the Interior in cooperation with the internal security authorities and other key 
actors (monitoring system), all ministries for their own part (steering).
SET OF MEASURES 7: 
SECURITY WORK 
IN COUNTIES 
AND MUNICIPALITIES
OBJECTIVE
Security planning, preventive security work and preparedness are some of the tasks that the 
new counties will see to. The counties will also have the possibility of steering security work 
carried out in municipalities. 
7
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Everyday security will be improved in the regional government reform by ensuring that security 
cooperation structures where the authorities, the business sector and NGOs work in extensive 
and cross-sectoral cooperation will be put in place. 
In the counties’ and municipalities’ security work, the individual can also be taken into consid-
eration in an equal and participatory manner.
RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:
Diverse polarisation, security impacts of migration, fragmentation of shared values, global 
security environment, technology, public finances, extremist movements
 
SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS
Up-to-date foresight and situation awareness
Efficient security structures and processes
Combating insecurity caused by social exclusion
Crisis resilient individuals and society
MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE
1.   Recommendations on including internal security in the counties’ and municipali-
ties’ strategies will be produced, and the security planning in counties and muni-
cipalities will be harmonised and incorporated in electronic wellbeing reports. This 
work will be based on the Ministry of the Interior’s publication Päätöksiä turvallisuu-
desta (Decisions on security, 2014) and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health's 
recommendations Tunnista, turvaa ja toimi (Identify, safeguard and act, 2008). The 
outputs of a project on the organisation and preparation of regional level coordinati-
on of preparedness in the counties will be utilised. 
2.   Indicators that produce appropriate information on the status of internal security in 
municipalities and counties will be specified.
3.   The organisation of the counties’ internal security duties will be supported and 
promoted. The operating models of tried and tested good practices, including the 
Security network in Lapland and the Pirkanmaa security cluster, will be utilised. 
Through cooperation networks, regional information exchange and problem-solving 
networks will be created between the authorities, companies, educational instituti-
ons and NGOs, and the creation of new products and services that improve security 
will be promoted. 
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RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholder in bold)
The Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Ministry of Finance, 
the Security Committee, the counties, the municipalities, the National Council for Crime 
Prevention, the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities, the National Institute 
for Health and Welfare
SET OF MEASURES 8: 
MONITORING
OBJECTIVE
The implementation and monitoring of the Internal Security Strategy will be carried out in 
an open and interactive manner, using a digital service channel.
At the core of the internal security work will be a common knowledge base, structured and 
analysed information, and the communication of this information to all stakeholders of internal 
security work in a versatile manner. The knowledge base will rest on up-to-date, verified and 
essential information that will be obtained not only from the current sources but also through 
the analysis and foresight function to be established under this Strategy.
RESPONDS TO THE FOLLOWING IDENTIFIED DRIVERS OF CHANGE:
Diverse polarisation, security impacts of migration, fragmentation of shared values, global 
security environment, technology, public finances, extremist movements
SUPPORTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FOLLOWING STRATEGIC GOALS:
Efficient security structures and processes
Up-to-date foresight and situation awareness
Crisis resilient individuals and society
8
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MEANS FOR ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE
1.   An internal security service channel will be set up that serves as an interactive 
cooperation platform for experts, stakeholders and civic society and also as a chan-
nel for monitoring strategy implementation. 
2.   While the main responsibility for administrating the service channel will rest with 
the Ministry of the Interior, its content production will be seen to by a broad-based 
cross-sectoral group in which all actors relevant to internal security strategy work 
will be represented (authorities, the business sector, NGOs, research institutes).
3.   The projects, experiments, operating models, information, social media and re-
search related to the Internal Security Strategy will be collected in this service 
channel. The contents, which will also include information on different networks 
and seminars, will follow a phenomenon-based structure. 
RESPONSIBLE STAKEHOLDERS (main stakeholder in bold)
The Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Finance, the Government ICT Centre Valtori, a 
large group of actors participating in internal security network cooperation, including the 
business sector and NGOs
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Hasari Marko SPEK Managing Director
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Häkämies Jyri EK Managing Director
Järvikare Terhi Ministry of Finance Director General
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Koivuranta Eija Family Federation of Finland Managing Director
Koskinen Esko Ministry of the Interior/ Director General
      Dept. for Rescue Services 
Koskinen Jari Association of Finnish Local  Director General
      and Regional Authorities  
Kosonen Mikko Sitra President
Kumpula Kristiina Finnish Red Cross Secretary General 
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Lehikoinen Anita Ministry of Education and Culture Permanent Secretary
Lehmus Pasi Valtori Managing Director
Luoma Raimo National Emergency Supply Centre Chief Executive Officer
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Martikainen Harri Ministry of the Interior Director of Strategic Steering and Development 
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